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Abstract  
 
This study assesses the relationship between tribalism (the tribalism 
index) and government effectiveness (per the World Bank) in 65 
countries using cross-sectional data averages from 2000-2010. This 
study finds that countries with high-tribal populations generally enjoy 
bad governance in terms of government ineffectiveness. Government 
ineffectiveness and tribalism are found to mutually reinforce each 
other in a robust relationship. 
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1. Introduction 
There is a substantial body of literature on the effect of ethnic diversity on the 
delivery of public commodities and the quality of government (e.g. Easterly  & 
Levine, 1997;  La Porta et al, 1999; Treisman, 2000; Alesina et al., 2003; Miguel 
& Gugerty, 2005; Kimenyi, 2006; Habyarimana et al, 2007). The innovation of 
the present line of inquiry is to extend the underlying literature by assessing the 
relationship between tribalism and government effectiveness. Accordingly, 
tribalism represents a more holistic measurement compared to ethnic diversity 
because it is a proxy that more closely reflects actions by individuals than ‘ethnic 
diversity’ which reflects a situational element (Kodila-Tedika & Asongu, 2015).  
 We postulate that countries with higher levels of tribalism should deliver 
less government effectiveness. In other words, the formulation and 
implementation of policies that deliver public commodities should be less 
apparent in countries with high levels of tribalism. Hence, the theoretical 
underpinnings associating ethnic diversity to low institutional quality are the same 
employed by this study. Meanwhile, as sustained earlier, tribalism represents a 
broader concept, relative to ethnic diversity.  
 In fact, tribalism is a doctrine which consists of unreasonably favouring 
individuals within a tribe or group of tribes. It is considered as an ethnic 
instrumentation by Mankou (2007). According to Jacobson and Deckard (2012), it 
entails scourges of corruption, rent seeking, inequality, indigenous population and 
group grievance. Hence, this note contributes to the existing literature by 
assessing the relationship between tribalism and government effectiveness.  
 The rest of the note is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the data 
and methodology. The empirical analysis is covered in Section 3. Section 4 
concludes.  
 
2. Data 
Data on government effectiveness/efficiency is obtained from the dataset 
compiled by Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2010) at the World Bank. The 
indicator is based on 30 underlying data sources reporting the perceptions of 
governance from a large number of survey respondents and expert assessments 
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worldwide. Government effectiveness/efficiency is distributed between 2.5 and 
22.5 (best). 
To measure tribalism, we use the tribalism index data by Jacobson and Deckard 
(2012). It is a weighted aggregate of the detailed components, which ranges from 
a score of 0 (the hypothetical lowest score) to a score of 1 (the highest). Figure 1 
shows that there exist substantial variations in tribalism across the world. The 
highest consumption levels can be found primarily in developing countries. 
 
 
 
As for control variables, we include openness to trade (or KOF index of economic 
globalization) from the literature (Dreher 2006, Dreher et al., 2008) for the year 
2005 (from Penn World Tables 6.3); the log of GDP per capita for the year 2005 
(from Penn World Tables 6.3); democracy for the year 2005 (from Cheibub et al., 
2010); average years of schooling (% of population aged 25 and over) form Barro 
and Lee (2010); legal origin and geographical location to account for recent 
debates in the institution’s literature (e.g. Kodila-Tedika, 2014 ; Kodila-Tedika et 
al., 2013; Asongu, 2012). Following the trend in the literature, legal origin is 
captured by distinguishing between the English, French, German, Scandinavian 
and socialist legal heritages (La Porta et al., 1999). We estimate the model with 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and robust standard errors. 
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3. Results 
3.1 Basic results 
Table 1 presents the basic results. Model 1 estimates the relationship between 
tribalism and government effectiveness/efficiency without a conditioning 
information set (or control variables) while the remaining models include some 
controls, unless where these were dropped due to multicollinearity. With the 
exception of the regional indicator, the control variables, included in these 
regressions, display the expected signs and are statistically significant in several 
cases. Per capita income is statistically significant at the 1% level in Column 3 
and has the expected negative sign. Higher income is thus associated with high 
government effectiveness/efficiency (Asongu, 2014). The results show, however, 
that democracy does not have a significant effect on government 
effectiveness/efficiency. The KOF index of economic globalization is statistically 
significant at the 10% level and has the expected positive sign. Globalization thus 
improves government effectiveness (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2015). 
The variable of interest is negative and statistically significant in all cases.  
Accordingly, the coefficients of the tribalism are statistically significant at the 1% 
level in all regressions. In the first column that does not include other 
determinants, the tribalism variable accounts for 40.8% of variations in 
government effectiveness/efficiency. 
 
Table 1. Basic results 
 
1 2 3 
Tribalism -2.854*** -3.014*** -1.633*** 
 
(0.529) (0.578) (0.436) 
Africa 
 
-2.948*** 
 
  
(0.165) 
 
Americas 
 
-3.066*** -0.841*** 
  
(0.332) (0.239) 
Asia 
 
-2.606*** -0.138 
  
(0.208) (0.145) 
Europa 
 
-2.476*** -0.492* 
  
(0.344) (0.255) 
Oceania 
 
 0.851** 
   
(0.331) 
GDP per capita (log) 
  
0.512*** 
   
(0.092) 
Democracy 
  
0.192 
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(0.147) 
Economicglobalization 
  
0.010* 
   
(0.005) 
LegalOrigin (UK) 
  
0.347* 
   
(0.184) 
LegalOrigin (french) 
  
0.190 
   
(0.148) 
LegalOrigin (german) 
  
0.457** 
   
(0.223) 
Constant 1.568*** 4.385*** -4.240*** 
 
(0.283) (0.509) (0.790) 
Number of observations 63 63 63 
R
2
 0.408 0.627 0.831 
Notes:  .01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - *; Standard errors in brackets. UK: United 
Kingdom. Log: logarithm.   
 
3.2 Robustness checks 
We verify if the established negative relationship withstands further empirical 
scrutiny in a plethora of robustness checks. In order to further improve the 
estimations, we follow the empirical approach on M-estimators by Huber (1973) 
using Iteratively Reweighted Least Squares (IRWLS). As Midi and Talib (2008) 
have noted, compared to  the  OLS approach, the advantage of these robust 
estimators is that they simultaneously fix any issue arising from the existence of 
outliers and/or heteroskedasticity (non-constant error variances).  We find in 
Table 2 that the signs and significance of the variables across specifications are 
consistent with those of Table 1.  
In Table 3 and Table 4, additional continental clusters and more control 
variables are used. The additional control variables include: average years of 
schooling (Barro and Lee 2010), social trust (Bjørnskov 2011), size of the shadow 
economy (Dreher and Schneider 2010), an Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) dummy variable. The signs of the 
independent variables of interest are consistent with those in Tables 1-2.  
4. Conclusion 
We argue in this article that the level of tribalism is likely to affect the 
government effectiveness/efficiency enjoyed by the population of a country. Our 
econometric analysis has established that countries with high-tribal populations 
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generally enjoy bad governance in terms of government ineffectiveness. 
Government ineffectiveness and tribalism are found to mutually reinforce each 
other in a robust relationship. 
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Table 2.  Controlling for Outliers (IRWLS) 
 
eq1 eq2 eq3 
Tribalism -3.315*** -2.998*** -1.744*** 
 
(0.414) (0.550) (0.464) 
Africa 
 
-0.483* 0.548* 
  
(0.265) (0.301) 
Americas 
 
-0.649** -0.288 
  
(0.253) (0.205) 
Asia 
 
-0.144 0.368 
  
(0.264) (0.238) 
GDP per capita (log) 
  
0.486*** 
   
(0.112) 
Economic globalization 
  
0.012* 
   
(0.006) 
Democracy 
  
0.130 
   
(0.156) 
LegalOrigin (UK) 
  
-0.148 
   
(0.356) 
LegalOrigin (French) 
  
-0.279 
   
(0.357) 
LegalOrigin (Socialist) 
  
-0.495 
   
(0.389) 
Constant 1.770*** 1.904*** -4.057*** 
 
(0.242) (0.261) (1.195) 
Number of observations 63 62 62 
R
2
 0.513 0.564 0.805 
Notes:  .01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - *; Standard errors in brackets. UK: United 
Kingdom. Log: logarithm.   
 
Table 3.  Regression Results (clustered by continent) 
 
eq4 eq5 eq6 
Tribalism -2.854** -3.014** -1.633** 
 
(0.734) (0.946) (0.448) 
Africa 
 
-2.948***  
  
(0.201)  
Americas 
 
-3.066*** -0.841** 
  
(0.466) (0.288) 
Asia 
 
-2.606*** -0.138 
  
(0.241) (0.122) 
Europa 
 
-2.476*** -0.492 
  
(0.482) (0.338) 
Oceania 
 
 0.851* 
   
(0.359) 
GDP per capita (log) 
  
0.512*** 
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(0.093) 
Democracy 
  
0.192 
   
(0.172) 
Economic globalization 
  
0.010 
   
(0.010) 
Legal Origin (UK) 
  
0.347 
   
(0.173) 
Legal Origin (French) 
  
0.190* 
   
(0.082) 
Legal Origin (German) 
  
0.457 
   
(0.266) 
Constant 1.568** 4.385*** -4.240*** 
 
(0.413) (0.832) (0.772) 
Number of observations 63 63 63 
R
2
 0.408 0.627 0.831 
Notes:  .01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - *; Standard errors in brackets. UK: United 
Kingdom. Log: logarithm.   
 
Table 4.  Regression Results  (add variables) 
 
eq7 eq8 
Tribalism -0.921* -0.921** 
 
(0.509) (0.299) 
Americas -0.664* -0.664** 
 
(0.327) (0.198) 
Asia -0.156 -0.156 
 
(0.167) (0.100) 
Europa -0.595* -0.595* 
 
(0.312) (0.220) 
Oceania 0.147 0.147* 
 
(0.262) (0.061) 
GDP per capita (log) 0.318* 0.318*** 
 
(0.168) (0.059) 
Democracy 0.173 0.173 
 
(0.172) (0.210) 
Economic globalization 0.019*** 0.019*** 
 
(0.006) (0.003) 
Legal Origin (UK) 0.286** 0.286* 
 
(0.136) (0.126) 
Legal Origin (socialist) -0.134 -0.134** 
 
(0.182) (0.030) 
Legal Origin (german) 0.229 0.229 
 
(0.249) (0.151) 
OECD 0.268 0.268* 
 
(0.172) (0.106) 
Trust 0.005 0.005 
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(0.005) (0.004) 
Schadow -0.012 -0.012 
 
(0.008) (0.007) 
Average years of schooling 0.025 0.025 
 
(0.045) (0.012) 
Constant  -3.272*** -3.272** 
 
(1.187) (0.717) 
Cluster continent Non Yes 
Number of observations 49 49 
R
2
 0.910 0.910 
Notes:  .01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - *; Standard errors in 
brackets. UK: United Kingdom. Log: logarithm. OECD: 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development.    
 
